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In this paper, I examine the determinants of 10-year sovereign bond yield 
relative to Germany for a panel of 10 Euro area countries for a period between 1999 and 
2019. Beyond the usual variables such as vix, real effective exchange rate, expected 
budget balance, expected debt-to-GDP and GDP growth, I studied the impact of fiscal 
rules and ECB monetary policy measures, namely the LTRO, SMP and PSPP. My work 
finds that, when tested individually, an increase in bid ask spreads, real effective 
exchange rate and expected debt leads to an increase in yield spreads while an increase 
in GDP growth and in budget balance leads to a decrease in bond yields. I also found 
that an increase on the average credit ratings have a negative impact on bond yields. 
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1. Introduction  
The idea of having coordinated economic and fiscal policies, a common 
monetary policy, and a common currency has been an ambition for the European Union 
countries since 1960. In 1992 the desire to create an economic and monetary union 
started to take shape when the Maastricht Treaty was signed by the leaders of the 
twelve countries who making up the European Community at that time (Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg, France, Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain). One of the Maastricht Treaty's priorities was economic 
policy and the convergence of EU member state economies. Therefore, the treaty 
established a timeline for the creation and implementation of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). The EMU aimed to create a new economic ecosystem known as the euro 
area, which include a common economic and monetary union, a central banking system, 
and a common currency. After almost a decade of preparation, the euro was launched 
on 1 January 1999, although coins and banknotes were launched only on 1 January 2002. 
Since the introduction of the common currency, we lived some turmoil periods 
that had an impact in sovereign bond yields. First, until the financial crisis of 2008, with 
the elimination of exchange rate risk, sovereign bond yields converged almost perfectly 
for the euro-area countries, however, following the 2008 international financial crisis, 
and notably after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 2008, the behaviour 
of sovereign spreads changed dramatically and government borrowing costs started to 
significantly diverge. 
 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, governments increased their 
expenditures, cut taxes, launched economic stimulus packages and therefore deficits 
and debt levels increased sharply and investors started to doubt the ability of certain 
countries to pay their debts and required higher credit risk premium. With bond yields 
soaring, we witnessed the emergence of a sovereign-debt crisis in several members of 
the Eurozone, namely Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In the Greek case, sovereign 
bond spreads had reached almost 300 basis points and by 2010 they had skyrocketed to 
over 1000 basis points. 




Also during the sovereign debt crisis, we witnessed a dramatically increase in 
credit ratings importance on the assumption that credit rating agencies may disclose  
important information to financial markets about the creditworthiness of a country. 
Regarding this subject, Kunovac and Ravnik (2017) argue that policymakers are 
overrating the importance of rating agencies and rating agencies should not be overly 
important for public discussions even though the average reaction of spreads to rating 
announcements proved to be statistically significant. 
The intensity of the crisis has prompted an extensive intervention on behalf of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) at various phases of the crisis in the European 
sovereign bond markets. Thus, in 2015, through an asset purchase programme, ECB 
implemented “quantitative easing” measures, extending the ECB’s existing programmes 
of private sector assets purchases to include purchases of sovereign bonds. In early 
2019, the bank announced another round of easing through targeted long-term 
refinancing operations (TLTROs), just months after the end of its opened-ended QE 
program. The TLTROs are Euro system operations that provide financing to credit 
institutions for periods of up to four years. They offer long-term funding at attractive 
conditions to banks to further ease private sector credit conditions and stimulate bank 
lending to the real economy. 
This ECB’s Asset Purchase Programme (APP) was introduced to boost lending, lift 
inflation rates to levels below, but close to 2% over the medium term and is part of a 
package of non-standard monetary policy measures that also includes targeted longer-
term refinancing operations. Among the ECB´s Asset Purchase Programme we have 
three finished  (Covered bond purchase programme (CBPP), Second Covered bond 
purchase programme (CBPP2) and Securities Markets Programme(SMP)) and four 
ongoing programmes (third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), asset-backed 
securities purchase programme (ABSPP), corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) 
and public sector purchase programme (PSPP)). Since 2015 the Public Sector Purchase 
Programme (PSPP) has been the main instrument for Quantitative Easing (QE) in the 
euro area and despite the net asset purchases under the PSPP ended in 2018, the ECB 




has communicated that QE will remain part of the toolbox in the future. It is foreseen as 
an instrument of monetary policy that will be used for contingencies. 
Another important issue that might help to explain the behaviour of 10-year 
government bond yield of euro area countries is the ECB fiscal policy. In this regard, 
there is a growing empirical literature studying if fiscal rules reduce borrowing costs, 
more specifically through the excessive deficit procedure which introduced rules to 
avoid ‘excessive’ deficits and recommend that deficits should remain below 3% of GDP 
and that debt-to-GDP ratios should be below 60% or, at least, decline quickly towards 
that level and deviations from these rules could lead to financial sanctions being 
imposed upon a country. Since individual countries cannot use monetary and exchange 
rate policies, fiscal rules are particularly important in the European monetary union to 
answer to country-specific shocks, imposing long-lasting constraint on fiscal policy 
through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates.  
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the determinants of government 
bond yields relative to German bond between 1999 and 2019 in 10-euro area countries, 
namely Austria Belgium, Finland, France; Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. After more than two decades since the single currency creation, the 
study of government bond yields and which determinants influence their behaviour 
continues to arouse a lot of interest. 
Although it already exists a vast literature on the topic, this study remains 
relevant not only due to the vast range of variables that could explain the fluctuations 
of 10-year government bonds but also due to new data that continue to emerge over 
the years. Markets started to take into consideration additional variables especially after 
the eruption of the financial crisis. Among the group of determinants, which has 
received more attention in recent years, are the ECB monetary policy operations, the 
adoption of fiscal rules and the increasing relevance of credit ratings. 
In order to study the determinants of the 10-year sovereign bond yields, I started 
to estimate an equation where I included the traditional determinants like the real 
effective exchange rate, vix, expected budget balance, expected debt-to-GDP, bid-ask 




spread and GDP growth rate plus the average credit ratings which accounts for a simple 
average of the three main credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch).  
In order to capture further insights regarding the movements of spreads in my 10 Euro 
area countries panel, I included a fiscal rule index to measure the strength of fiscal rules. 
This index covers all types of numerical fiscal rules, namely budget balance, debt, 
expenditure and revenue rules.  The scope of information includes the description and 
definition of the fiscal rule and its coverage, its statutory base, monitoring bodies, 
correction mechanisms in case of deviation from the rule, as well as experience with the 
respect of the rule. Additionally, to capture the influence of ECB´s monetary policy 
measures, I included an equation in my study including the Longer-term Refinancing 
Operations (LTRO) and two asset purchase programmes, namely securities market 
program (SMP) and public sector purchase program (PSPP).  
My study finds that, when tested individually, an increase in bid ask spreads, real 
effective exchange rate, expected debt and fiscal rules, leads to an increase in yield 
spreads while an increase in GDP growth and in budget balance leads to a decrease in 
bond yields. I also found that an increase on the average credit ratings have a negative 
impact on bond yields. Finally, in what it concerns with ECB quantitative easing I do not 
found any evidence of statistically significance. 
This work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on this topic, 
chapter 3   describes the methodology, and chapter 4 includes a detailed explanation of 











2. Literature review 
According to Codogno et al. (2003) before the implementation of the EMU, yield 
differentials within Europe were determined by four main factors: expected exchange 
rate movements and exchange rate risk, different tax treatments and controls on capital 
movements, liquidity, and default or credit risk. Exchange rate factors were eliminated 
in January 1999 for EMU countries, and tax treatments were harmonized before 
monetary union, while controls on capital movements had been removed long before 
that. The other two factors, however, remain relevant. 
Despite the fact that the literature on this topic is divided into two broad 
categories, covering the period prior to and following the global financial crisis, the 
existing literature is unanimous in pointing out that spreads of euro area government 
bond markets reflect three main variables: credit risk, liquidity risk and an international 
risk factor, as we can perceive, for example at Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009), Codogno 
et al. (2003) or at Favero et al. (2010). 
 Credit risk is the possibility that borrowers cannot repay the loan but in this case 
is the possibility of default on behalf of a sovereign borrower. Even though this risk tends 
to be low in European countries, defaults can still happen, and this risk need to be 
considered. See for example, Afonso et al. (2015), Afonso and Rault (2015), Ardagna et 
al. (2007) and Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999). Geyer et al. (2004) findings support the 
hypothesis that credit risk explains a substantial part of EMU government bond spreads. 
According to Afonso et al. (2015) liquidity risk is the source of risk that refers to 
the size and depth of the sovereign bonds market and captures the possibility of capital 
losses due to early liquidation or significant price reductions resulting from a small 
number of transactions. Besides Afonso et al. (2015), Favero et al. (2010), Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas (2012), Gómez-Puig (2006), Jankowitsch et al.  (2006) are some of the most 
important articles that approach the importance of this variable. 
 The international risk factor captures the level of perceived financial risk and its 
unit price. Typically, this is empirically approximated using indexes of US stock market 




implied volatility or the spread between the yields of US corporate bonds against US 
treasury bills. That is the argument that Codogno et al. (2003) work defend. Their results 
also suggest that international factors are more important than liquidity for the 
determination of yield differentials in the Euro area (except France). While this result is 
obtained by simple regressions, Geyer et al. (2004) arrive at a similar conclusion but 
using a more sophisticated theoretical and econometric set up. 
As I mentioned before, another point of consensus on this topic is that the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009 had a big influence on sovereign bond yield behaviour. This 
subject, fall into two broad categories, which cover the period prior to and following the 
global financial crisis. De Santis (2012) suggests that euro area countries with the largest 
government deficit-debt combination and therefore with the highest credit risk were 
the countries subject to numerous credit rating changes and mostly affected during the 
crisis. Afonso et al. (2014) considers a group of euro area countries between 1999 and 
2010 and concludes that macro and fiscal risks priced by markets has been significantly 
enriched since March 2009, including international financial risk and liquidity risk. 
Afonso and Jalles (2018) conclude that the international risk factor (VIX) is price around 
7–8 times more after the crisis and that liquidity is also a key determinant after the crisis. 
Mody (2009) and Acharya et al. (2014) findings support previous studies and argue that 
international risk factors were quite relevant during the crisis and have fed back via the 
financial sector. Mody (2009) also found that exposure to financial sector weakness was 
not an important determinant of sovereign spreads prior to the collapse of Bear Sterns 
in March 2008. Attinasi et al. (2009) and Barrios et al. (2009) achieve the same idea, 
which is that higher expected budget deficits and/or higher government debt ratios 
relative to Germany contributed to higher government bond yield spreads in the euro 
area during the analysed period. Barrios et al. (2009) also conclude that the impact of 
domestic factors on bond yield spreads increase significantly during the crisis, when 
international investors started to discriminate more between countries. Bernoth and 
Erdogan (2010) find that before the financial crisis, the coefficient of the deficit 
differential between the issuer country and Germany fluctuated around zero and was 
insignificant. After the intensification of the financial crisis in the end of 2008, the 




coefficient of the deficit differential remained continuously positive and shows an 
increasing trend. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Central Bank started buying 
assets from commercial banks as part of its non-standard monetary policy in an 
operation called quantitative easing. Afonso and Kazemi (2017) findings suggest that the 
ECB´s quantitative easing measures have negatively affected 10-year sovereign yield 
spreads in the euro area, notably Longer-term Refinancing Operations, Targeted Longer-
term Refinancing Operations and the Securities Market Program. Still in this topic, 
Kinateder and Wagner (2017) state that ECB´s quantitative easing has a pronounced 
spread decreasing effect. However, the authors note that the long-term consequences 
of such unconventional monetary policy may exhibit an inverse sign. Hence, the results 
do not exclude that longer-term financial stability could be negatively affected. Based 
on an event study on different asset price channel, Urbschat and Watzka (2017) found 
that the effects of the asset purchase program were strong in the first round but the 
marginal impact of every additional package decreased over time. They also showed 
that core countries usually have shown weaker responses and the reduction has been 
more pronounced for periphery countries. In another study regarding this topic, De 
Santis (2020) using a country-panel error correction model with Bloomberg news also 
conclude that the vulnerable countries benefited the most from quantitative easing.  De 
Santis concludes that most of the impact occurred between September 2014 and 
February 2015, in line with the view that investors discounted the implications of the 
monetary policy before the actual purchases even started. 
 Afonso and Tovar Jalles (2018) using a panel of euro area countries over the 
period 1999.01–2016.07 also claim that ECB’s intervention did contribute to contain 
sovereign yield spreads. 
Afonso and Jalles (2016), using data from 10 euro area countries, assessed the 
determinants of government bond yield spreads and found that better fiscal positions 
or higher than expected growth prospects reduce the yield spreads, while increases in 
the VIX, bid ask, debt-to-GDP ratio or real effective exchange rate increase the spreads. 




They also found that for the case of budget balance and real GDP, the larger (higher) in 
absolute value the corresponding spread’s responsiveness, the lower the volatility and 
for the bid ask spread, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the real effect exchange rate and the VIX, 
higher spread sensitivities imply higher economic volatility. 
Heppke-falk and Hüfner (2004) studied the impact of the projected budget 
deficit ratio for 12 months ahead on the swap spread for Italy, France and Germany 
between January 1994 and July 2004. The results varied with respect to countries and 
time, but they concluded that at least for Germany and France, the deficit ratio seems 
to exert an increasing influence over time and this outcome suggests that market 
discipline has become more important along with EMU membership. It is important to 
mention that this article do not studied the entire effect through which budget deficits 
can influence interest rates. 
Afonso (2010) studied the effects of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts on long-
term government bond yields of 14 euro area countries between 1998 and 2008 and the 
results show that 10-year general government yields increase with better growth 
forecasts, and with decreases in the budget balance-to-GDP ratios, signalling that 
sovereigns need to pay a higher price to finance higher forecasted budget deficits. 
 Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2012) studied the oldest and the most important 
euro zone countries and their findings suggest that the expected debt-to-GDP ratio 
explains a major part of the differences in bond yields in the euro area between 2003 
and the unfolding of the financial crises. The authors go further and state that most of 
the time, the debt-to-GDP ratio is the single most powerful explanatory variable. 
Likewise the previous article Haugh et al. (2009) work suggest that an increase in 
expected fiscal deficits is likely playing a large role in the increase in spreads across all 
countries. In another work, Costantini et al. (2014) results show that fiscal imbalances, 
namely expected government debt-to-GDP differentials, are the main long-run drivers 
of sovereign spreads. Gómez-Puig (2006) results support the existence of a non-linear 
relationship between relative debt levels and adjusted spreads, which was accentuated 
by EMU. 




A similar result was found by Kumar and Baldacci (2010). They studied the impact 
of fiscal deficit and public debt on long-term interest rates over almost three decades 
between 1980 and 2008 and realized that large deficits and debt can have a marked 
adverse impact on bond yields, but that a variety of domestic and international factors 
are likely to determine the magnitude of this impact.  
 Robbins and Simonsen (2012) study the US state debt levels and borrowing costs 
over a six-year period (2001–2006) and the evidence founded does not indicate that the 
market extracted a penalty for increasing debt loads. 
 Another factor that increased its relevance to explain the government bond yield 
spreads were credit ratings. Afonso, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2015) findings on this 
topic suggest that the role of credit rating agencies in spreads determination within the 
euro area is relevant, yet the inclusion of ratings and outlook announcements into the 
models does not result in any significant improvement of the models’ fit and explanatory 
power compared to macro and fiscal fundamentals, which means that the role of ratings 
is limited. Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012) work show significant responses of 
government bond yield spreads to changes in rating notations and outlook, particularly 
in the case of negative announcements. Afonso, Gomes and Taamouti (2014) also 
addressed the credit rating topic and they show that sovereign rating changes have 
asymmetric effects on both equity and bond volatilities. The authors also conclude that 
it seems now that sovereign rating announcements create interdependence among 
European financial markets with upgrades (downgrades) in one country leading to a 
decrease (increase) in volatility of the other countries. 
It is also important to mention that the major part of the articles presented in 
this section suggest that the relation between determinants and government bond 
spreads varies over time and that the relative importance of the determinants can 
change over time. The altering in risk pricing over time confirms the need of time-varying 
coefficient models in this context. Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004), Afonso 
and Jalles, (2016) among others, are some of the examples of this approach. 
 




3. Methodology   
Regarding the model approach, I followed the existing literature, namely Afonso, 
Jalles and Kazemi, (2020), Afonso, Arghyrou and Kontonikas, (2015) and Afonso and 
Kazemi, (2017). 
As mentioned before, I studied the 10-year sovereign bond yield against a 
commonly accepted benchmark, the yield on German government bonds for a panel of 
10 Euro area countries. Hence, the sovereign bond spread is the difference between the 
sovereign yield of country i and the benchmark yield of Germany with the same maturity 
in t: 
                                   𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡  =  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐷𝐸𝑡.           (1) 
Therefore, the main regression equation is the following:     
                                   spreadsit  = αi + ρt + βitXit + εit.         (2) 
Where spreadsit  denotes the 10-year government bond yield spread versus 
Germany. Xit is a vector of determinants, which, will be explained, in the next chapter, 
and the coefficient βit measures the degree of sensitivity of sovereign spreads to a given 
determinant. αi denotes country effects capturing unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries, and time-unvarying factors. ρt represents time effects and aim to control for 
global shocks. Finally, εit is a disturbance term satisfying usual assumptions of zero mean 
and constant variance.  
Therefore, I present below the simplest version of my model, including some of 
the explanatory variables: 
spreadsit  = αi + ρt + β1𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + β4𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+β5𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
β6𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + β7𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + εit           (3) 
After the estimation of equation (3), I added a fourth and fifth equation aiming 
to capture further insights regarding the movements of spreads in my 10 Euro area 
countries panel. Thus, in equation (4) I will consider the strength of fiscal rules, which 
are measured by the European Commission’s Fiscal Rule Index (FRI). This index combines 




quantitative and qualitative characteristics of a country’s existing fiscal rules and 
measures their strength. In equation (5) I will study ECB policy measures:   
spreadsit  = αi + ρt + β1𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+β4𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
β5𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + β6𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + β6𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 + εit       (4) 
spreadsit  = αi + ρt + β1𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+β4𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
β5𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + β6𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + β7𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 + β8𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + β9𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  εit.       (5) 
The equations mentioned above are first estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. As I mentioned above, I 
consider specifications with and without country and/or time effects for robustness 
purposes. Time fixed effects are included to control for global shocks; country fixed 
effects are included to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and time 
invariant characteristics (geography, institutional aspects, etc.).Then, due to potential 
endogeneity concerns of some of my variables in the vector, I rely on a Two-Stage-Least-














4. Data and Explanatory Variables 
4.1. Data 
I analyse a panel data containing countries that have adopted the single currency 
since it was first introduced in 1999, plus Greece and excluding Luxemburg. Thus, in 
addition to Germany, I analyse ten-euro area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  
I will use annual data for the period between 1999-2019. Therefore, the sample 
covers several important economic events such as the introduction of the Euro in 1999, 
the financial crisis in 2007/2008, the European sovereign debt crisis and the European 
Central Bank’s expanded asset purchase programme.  
The dependent variable in my econometric analysis is the annual 10-year 
government bond yield spread relative to Germany. I used Germany as reference 
because German government bonds have been reinforcing their safe and benchmark 
status, even during the financial crisis, and also because German bonds represent 
relatively high credit quality and liquidity.  
Regarding the behaviour of 10-year government bond yield of the countries that 
I will consider in my work, I might say that with the introduction of the common 
currency, sovereign bond yields stabilised at very low levels between 1999 and 2007, 
even though macroeconomic fundamentals were deteriorating in many euro area 
countries. With the outburst of the financial crisis, the outlook changed, spreads 
increased in all euro area economies due to the increasing fear of excessive sovereign 
debt and lenders started to demand higher interest rates from Eurozone states. In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, due to the uncertainty about the solvency of some 
Eurozone members, yields began to diverge again particularly in the so-called peripheral 
group (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Italy, and Spain). To counteract this trend, the ECB 
started buying assets from commercial banks in 2015 as part of its non-standard 
monetary policy measures known as quantitative easing. These measures presented a 
turning point in the euro area debt crisis and initiated a period of convergence in the 




sovereign bond yields that last until the present. Nowadays euro area countries enjoy 
close to zero or even negative yields. 
In the graphs below, Figure 1, we can perceive the evolution of 10-year bond 
yields between 1999 and 2019 in the target countries of the study. 
Figure 1 - 10-year bond yields 
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4.2. Description of Explanatory Variables 
Regarding the determinants of yield spreads, follows a description of all the 
explanatory variables and their theoretical relation to yield spread changes. 
-𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index that is adopted to 
reflect the international risk factor. It measures the “risk-neutral” expected stock market 
variance for the US S&P500 contracts, computed from the panel of option prices and 
has been used in the literature on euro area government bond spreads(see Beber et al., 
(2009) and Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff, (2010)). It is also known as the “fear index” for 




financial markets as VIX tends to spike during market turmoil periods. It is expected to 
observe an increase (reduction) in the government bond spreads after a rise (decline) in 
the value of the international risk factor. 
- 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 and 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  represent the expected government debt-to-GDP against 
Germany, and the expected government budget balance-to-GDP also against Germany, 
respectively, both one-year ahead. The magnitude of public debt and potential budget 
deficits affects the country’s ability to pay and is therefore a measure for credit quality. 
Higher expected debt might be a signal for market participants for deteriorating credit 
worthiness. In what it concerns with public debt, it is expected that a higher (lower) 
value should cause an increase (decrease) in yield spreads. While it is expected that a 
higher (lower) value for the government budget balance will reduce (increase) yield 
spreads. The use of expected, as opposed to historical fiscal data, is in line with several 
recent studies on EMU government bond yield spreads including Gerlach et al. (2010) 
and Sgherri and Zoli (2009). 
-𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 represents the 10-year bond yield Bid-ask spread, used as a measure 
of illiquidity. Many authors use bid-ask spreads to capture the liquidity effect in the EMU 
sovereign bond market. Among them we can point out Barrios et al. (2009), Favero et 
al. (2010), Gerlach et al (2010), Bernoth and Erdogan (2010). We can expect a higher 
(lower) value of this spread indicating a fall (increase) in liquidity leading to an increase 
(reduction) in government bond yield spreads. 
-𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the annual growth rate of GDP against Germany. With the inclusion of 
this variable, I want to show that a decrease in GDP growth makes sovereign debt riskier. 
Thus, it is expected that an increase (reduction) in growth performance improves 
(deteriorate) credit worthiness decreasing (increasing) yield spreads. 
-𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡  accounts for the role of sovereign credit ratings on government bond 
yield spreads. Following the work of Afonso et al. (2012), I computed the simple average 
of the three main credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch). The 
ratings were grouped in 17 categories, where AAA and Aaa observations receive the 
value 17 while the observations below B- and B3 receive the value 1. This allows 




analysing the effect of credit ratings announcements on spreads. It is expected that 
rating upgrades (downgrades) will decrease (increase) sovereign bond spreads. (See 
table VII in the appendix).  
-𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the log of the real effective exchange rate against Germany. This 
variable generally captures credit risk originating from general macroeconomic 
disequilibrium and may capture external competitiveness. A positive (negative) change 
appreciates (depreciates) the currency thus increasing (decreasing) yield spreads.   
In addition, I examined whether the adoption of numerical fiscal rules impact on 
sovereign bond yields. In order to study this subject, I used a Fiscal Rule Index available 
at European commission`s economic database, covering all types of numerical fiscal 
rules at all levels of government, as well as indices on the strength and quality of 
budgetary those rules. The composite Fiscal Rule Index is obtained as follow: First, a 
Fiscal Rule Strength Index (FRSI) is calculated taking into account five criteria: i) legal 
base, ii) binding character, iii) bodies monitoring compliance and the correction 
mechanism, iv) correction mechanisms, and v) resilience to shocks. The composite Fiscal 
Rule Strength Index is calculated for each rule by aggregating scores, with the use of an 
equal weighting-scheme. The scores of the five criteria mentioned above are first 
standardised to run between 0 and 1 and this calculation provides one index measuring 
the strength of each fiscal rule. Based on this fiscal rule strength index for each rule, a 
comprehensive time-varying fiscal rule index for each Member State was constructed 
by summing up all fiscal rule strength indices in force in the respective Member State 
weighted by the coverage of general government finances of the respective rule (i.e. 
public expenditure of the government sub sector(s) concerned by the rule over total 
general government expenditure). In the presence of more than one rule covering the 
same government sub-sector, the second, third and fourth rules obtain weights ½, ⅓, 
and ¼, to reflect decreasing marginal benefit of multiple rules applying to the same sub-
sector. The assigned weights are mainly determined by the fiscal strength of the rule 
and its coverage. This approach is similar to the one used by Heinemann et al., (2014). 




Finally, following Afonso and Kazemi (2017) work, I checked the effects of ECB 
intervention through various strands of QE. I covered the standard and non-standard 
measures of the ECB. Regarding the standard measures, I have included the Longer-term 
Refinancing Operations (LTRO), which provide longer-term refinancing to the financial 
sector. I also studied the effects of one finished program, Securities Market Program 
(SMP) and an ongoing program, Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) that is the 






















In this section, I will present the results obtained through the estimations of the 
equations explained above. The regression models are estimated over the period 
between 1999 and 2019 and the country panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
I started to estimate several determinants of bond yield spreads separately via 
OLS and Table I reports the results.  
Table I: Determinants of yield spreads 
OLS  










     
reer 
 
  38.444*** 
(6.046) 
    
gdp 
 
   -0.459*** 
(0.038) 
   
debt 
 










      0.314* 
(0.161) 
R-square 0.2647 0.6144 0.3888 0.5718 0.4615 0.0399 0.2837 
Nº obs. 210 210 210 210 200 210 200 
Note: the asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Fixed effects panel estimates. Dependent 
variable is the 10-year bond yield spread (relative to Germany). 
 
 As we see in table I, when tested individually, except for the volatility index, all 
determinates coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, on the one hand, vix, bid ask 
spreads, real effective exchange rate and expected debt have a positive impact on yield 
spreads. On the other hand, gdp growth and the expected budget balance have a 
negative impact on yield spreads. The results also show that an increase in fiscal rules 
impact positively in bond yield spreads. 
Due to the predictable correlation between expected debt and expected budget 
balance, I will not include both variables in the same equation. Hence, in the next step, 




I estimate equation (3) via OLS and 2SLS. The results regarding expected debt are 
presented in table II and regarding the expected budget balance are presented in table 
III. 
Table II: Expected debt and ratings 
 OLS 2SLS 























































R-square 0.7803 0.8366 0.3121 0.8240 
Nº obs. 200 200 170 170 
Note: the asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Dependent variable is the 10-year bond 
yield spread (relative to Germany). The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second and third lags of the 
dependent variable and the first three lags of the independent variables. 
 
The results in table II allow me to conclude that the bid ask spread and expected 
debt feature the expected coefficient signs and are statistically significant either when I 
test the equation with the credit ratings and when I test without the credit ratings. Vix, 
real effective exchange rate and gdp growth present inconsistent results. Finally, 
concerning average credit ratings, the estimation provides an expected negative 










Table III: Expected balance and ratings 
 OLS 2SLS 























































R-square 0.7718 0.8550 0.7550 0.8177 
Nº obs. 210 210 180 180 
Note: the asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Dependent variable is the 10-year bond 
yield spread (relative to Germany). The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second and third lags of the 
dependent variable and the first three lags of the independent variables. 
 
In table III I report the results with the expected budget balance. In the 
estimation without the credit ratings, bid ask spread, gdp growth and budget balance 
present the correct coefficient signs and are statistically significant. On the contrary, I 
do not found evidence of statistically significant impacts of Vix and real effective 
exchange rate (2SLS estimation) on yield spreads. 
However, when I include the average of credit ratings in the equation, the 
expected budget balance present a positive coefficient and has no statistical 
significance. Bid ask spread and gdp growth present the correct coefficient signs and are 
statistically significant. Once more, I can conclude that the credit ratings have a negative 
impact on yield spreads because as the table shows, credit ratings have a negative 
coefficient and are statistically significant. 
Moreover, in tables IV and V, I aim to capture further insights regarding the 10-
year sovereign bond yields. In order to accomplish that, I estimated the equations (4) 
and (5) where I included a fiscal rule index and several ECB monetary policy measures, 
namely Longer-term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), Securities Market Program (SMP) 




and Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP). As in previous estimates, first I include 
expected debt-to-GDP and then expected budget balance. 
Table IV: Debt, fiscal rules and monetary policy measures 
 OLS 2SLS 





















































































   0.134 
(0.153) 
   
Ltro  0.001*** 
(0.000) 
   0.001* 
(0.000) 
  
Smp   0.024* 
(0.014) 
   0.001 
(0.012) 
 
Pspp    0.000 
(0.000) 




0.7850 0.7996 0.9053 0.3474 0.4709 0.5404 0.8568 0.5056 
Nº obs. 190 171 40 45 160 141 25 27 
Note: the asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Dependent variable is the 10-year bond 
yield spread (relative to Germany). The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second and third lags of the 
dependent variable and the first three lags of the independent variables. 
 
 After adding fiscal rules and the quantitative easing measures, results in table IV 
shows that, among the new variables added, only ltro is statistically relevant in both OLS 
and 2SLS estimation, although this variable presents a positive sign when I expected a 
negative one. In the OLS estimation, I see that fiscal rules and the smp have a positive 










Table V: Budget balance, fiscal rules and monetary policy measures 
 OLS 2SLS 





























































































   -0.039 
(0.157) 










  0.008 
(0.010) 





   0.000 
(0.00) 




0.7746 0.6788 0.7906 0.3620 0.6041 0.7877 0.9159 0.04942 
Nº obs. 200 181 40 45 170 151 25 27 
Note: the asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10% respectively. Dependent variable is the 10-year bond 
yield spread (relative to Germany). The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second and third lags of the 
dependent variable and the first three lags of the independent variables. 
 
 Lastly, in table V I present the results with expected budget balance. Likewise, 
the results disclosed in the previous table, not all variables have economically expected 
signs. The ltro is significant and still have a positive impact of sovereign bond yields. 















In this paper I examined the impact of vix, bid ask spread, real effective exchange 
rate, GDP growth rate, expected budget balance, expected debt-to-GDP, credit ratings, 
fiscal rules and some ECB quantitative easing measures on sovereign debt yield spreads 
using a panel of 10 euro area countries for the period over 1999-2019. I estimated 
equation 3,4 and 5 via OLS and 2SLS. 
Overall, when tested individually, an increase in bid ask spreads, real effective 
exchange rate and expected debt leads to an increase in yield spreads, while an increase 
in GDP growth and in expected budget balance leads to a decrease on bond yields. I also 
found that an increase on simple average of the three main credit rating agencies 
(Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) have a negative impact on bond yields. 
Regarding fiscal rules, two estimates were made. First, I tested this determinant 
individually and I found that it affects positively the sovereign bond yield spreads. Then, 
I estimated equation (4), and only in the estimation via OLS with expected debt was 
found statistical significance by fiscal rules. As in the first estimation, fiscal rules have a 
positive impact on yield spreads. 
Furthermore, concerning the ECB’s monetary policy, LTRO affect positively the 
yield spreads. To SMP and PSPP I do not found evidence of statistically significance and 
that could be explained by the fact that a small number of observations are available. It 
is also important to mention that my results, particularly regarding LTRO do not support 
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Table VI: Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
spreds 10-year bond yield spread against Germany bond ECB 
vix Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index Chicago Board Options 
Exchange 
bid ask 10-year government bond bid-ask spread ECB 
debt Expected debt-to-GDP ratio European Commission 
balance Expected government budget balance-to-GDP 
ratio 
European Commission 
gdp GDP growth rate World Bank 
reer Real Effective exchange rate log against Germany World Bank 
ratings Credit ratings (Average of Fitch, Moody´s, S&P) Trading Economics 
Fiscal Rules European Commission’s (2006) Fiscal Rule Index European Commission 
SMP Nominal amount of securities markets 
programme 
ECB 
PSPP Net purchases of public sector securities under 
the public sector purchase programme 
ECB 
LTRO Longer-term refinancing operations ECB 
 
Table VII: Ratings Transformation 
Ratings Linear 
Transformation 
S&P Moody´s Fitch  
AAA Aaa AAA 17 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16 
AA Aa2 AA 15 
AA- Aa3 AA- 14 
A+ A1 A+ 13 
A A2 A 12 
A- A3 A- 11 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10 
BBB Baa2 BBB 9 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 8 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7 
BB Ba2 BB 6 
BB- Ba3 BB- 5 
B+ B1 B+ 4 
B B2 B 3 
B- B3 B- 2 




CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 
1 
CCC Caa2 CCC 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 
CC Ca CC 
  C 
SD C DDD 
D  DD 
  D 
 
